The Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) is a comprehensive framework designed to protect Federal Contract Information (FCI) and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), shared with contractors and subcontractors of the Department of Defense (DoD) through acquisition programs, as defined by Executive Order 13556.

The CMMC 2.0 Proposed Rule, published on December 26, 2023, represents the latest evolution of the CMMC cybersecurity model.

On June 27, 2024, after adjudicating nearly 2,000 comments, following a 60-day open-comment period, the DoD submitted a draft of the CMMC 2.0 Final Rule (32 CFR) to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) at the White House.

The summited draft represents the final step before the CMMC 2.0 rule is published in the Federal Register. As the final draft has been submitted the focus now shifts to the timeline for when the CMMC 2.0 regulation will take effect and be enforced.

Before addressing this shift in focus, it is essential to understand that the security requirements, upon which CMMC 2.0 Level 2 is founded (NIST SP 800-171), have been mandatory for DoD contractors handling sensitive information since December 2017, when the DFARS clause 252.204-7012 was included in DoD contracts. However, during this period, compliance mostly relied on self-attestation without a robust enforcement mechanism, leaving the DoD unable to verify adherence. As a result, many contractors neglected to fully implement the required controls.

To address this issue, the DoD launched the CMMC program, which essentially serves as the mechanism through which the DoD will verify compliance with the requirements outlined in DFARS clause 252.204-7012 (NIST SP 800-171), mandated in contracts since 2017.

As the DoD puts it: “A key difference between the DFARS 252.204-7012 and CMMC Level 2 requirements is that compliance with NIST SP 800-171 under DFARS 252.204-7012 has not been consistently verified. Under CMMC, compliance will be checked by independent third-party assessors certified by DoD.“

The significant change introduced by CMMC, requires contractors to obtain certification through assessments conducted by a CMMC Third Party Assessment Organization (C3PAO) to demonstrate compliance to retain and secure DoD contracts.

CMMC Rulemaking Timeline

The CMMC rulemaking timeline is summarized below based on publicly available information as of July 17, 2024.

As with all federal regulations, CMMC requires a legal basis for implementation. Therefore, to determine when the CMMC 2.0 regulation will come into effect, we need to understand the rulemaking process behind CMMC 2.0, involving two rules from the Code of Federal Regulations: 32 CFR and 48 CFR.

For the CMMC 2.0 regulation to come fully into effect, two things need to happen.

1. The 32 CFR CMMC Final Rule has to come into effect. This rule outlines and codifies the CMMC program and will allow CMMC third-party assessments to begin, known as the “market rollout“.

The 32 CFR CMMC Final Rule is estimated to be published no later than October 26, 2024, after OIRA’s review of up to 120 days, and will come into effect approximately 60 days later, in late Q3 or early Q4 2024.

2. 48 CFR CMMC Final Rule must come into effect. This rule revises the DFARS clause 252.204-7021 to point to the CMMC program (32 CFR) and will introduce CMMC compliance as a contractual clause gradually over 3 years, known as the “phased rollout“.

The 48 CFR Proposed Rule was submitted to OIRA in May 2024. After a 90 to 120-day regulatory review and an initial 60-day public comment period, the Proposed Rule will undergo another 60-day public comment period, followed by a Final Rule review and adjudication process, estimated to take 150 to 280 business days. The 48 CFR Final Rule is expected to come into effect around Q3 or Q4 2025 but could be sooner, as it revises an existing, small clause (DFARS clause 252.204-7021).

The 32 CFR is the Starting Gun for the CMMC Race

While the effective date of the 48 CFR Final Rule (expected in Q3 or Q4 2025) will determine when the CMMC 2.0 regulation is mandatorily included in contracts, known as the “phase-rollout,” it’s a significant misconception that the pivotal milestone for the start of the CMMC race is the effective date of the 48 CFR.

Indeed, the kickoff for the CMMC race will be determined by the effective date of the 32 CFR Final Rule (expected late Q3 or early Q4 2024), not the 48 CFR Final Rule.

The 32 CFR Final Rule will trigger the “market rollout“, which will allow CMMC assessments to begin. Once these assessments are available, prime contractors (e.g., Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon) will likely require subcontractors to obtain CMMC certification as soon as possible, well before DoD does through the “phased rollout“, to maintain their competitive edge and mitigate the risk of non-certified suppliers jeopardizing their own certification status.

Midnight Rulemaking and CMMC 2.0

In the past 6 months, there has been a notable acceleration in the CMMC rulemaking process. This is evident in several key milestones, including the publication of the 32 CFR Proposed Rule in December 2023, the submission of a 48 CFR Proposed Rule to OIRA in May 2024, and most recently, the submission of the 32 CFR Final Rule to OIRA in June 2024. This phenomenon is often referred to as “Midnight Rulemaking“, which describes the rush to finalize regulations in the final months before a presidential administration concludes.

Thus, if we anticipate the 32 CFR Final Rule to be finalized and effective in late Q3 or early Q4 2024, given the Department of Defense’s strong motivation to complete the CMMC regulations before the U.S. 2024 elections, there is a very strong possibility it will become effective before November 5, 2024.

Don’t Wait for the Starting Gun to Begin the CMMC Compliance Journey

The DoD anticipates that it will take two years for companies with existing contracts to become CMMC certified, assuming they have already implemented the NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 requirements as per DFARS clause 252.204-7012. This extended timeline is due to several factors:

1. Once 32 CFR becomes effective, CMMC third-party assessments for CMMC Level 2 will commence, requiring organizations to achieve 100% self-attestation readiness before undergoing assessment. This preparatory phase demands significant time and effort.
2. On average, organizations spend between 12 to 18 months preparing for a CMMC Level 2 assessment.
3. Due to a shortage of CMMC assessors, organizations may expect to wait approximately 9 to 15 months (3 to 5 quarters) for a CMMC assessment.

Therefore, to stay prepared for future DoD contract opportunities and maintain a competitive edge, it is recommended that organizations begin their CMMC compliance process today.

Feel free to reach out to discuss your CMMC journey with us and explore how #Wavestone can assist you in navigating the intricate landscape of CMMC 2.0 compliance, supporting your path to certification, and enhancing your cybersecurity readiness into a strategic advantage.

Our CMMC 2.0 Compliance Services:

1. CUI Identification:
   • We assist in identifying Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) within your organization to ensure compliance with CMMC requirements.
2. CMMC Assessment Scope Identification:
   • We help define and minimize your CMMC Assessment Scope to stay cost-effective and pragmatic. By clearly identifying the scope, we ensure that all necessary systems and processes are included while avoiding unnecessary complexity and costs.
3. CMMC Readiness Assessments:
   • Our experts conduct CMMC Level 1 and 2 readiness assessments, evaluating your current state against the respective assessment objectives (e.g., NIST SP 800-171A) to provide you with actionable recommendations.
4. CMMC Compliance Roadmap Definition:
   • We work with you to define a clear roadmap to achieve CMMC compliance, tailored to your needs, whether for CMMC clusters or all-in scenarios.
5. CMMC Implementation Support:
   • We offer comprehensive guidance and support throughout the implementation phase, helping you effectively integrate the required controls and reach CMMC 2.0 compliance.

Cet article Timeline Update: CMMC 2.0 and the Phenomenon of Midnight Rulemaking est apparu en premier sur RiskInsight.

These incidents, commonly referred to as “supply-chain attacks”, involve targeting an organization’s downstream third parties (e.g., partners, vendors) to gain access to valuable systems. In the Bank of America case, the compromised third party responsible for this breach, was Infosys McCamish Systems (IMS), an insurance process management services provider.

This breach resonates with the infamous SolarWinds cyberattack, where Nobelium hackers inserted malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion platform, enabling them to infiltrate numerous government systems, including the U.S.’ Homeland Security, State, Commerce, and Treasury, as well as private systems worldwide.

As corporate IT architectures are arguably a mere reflection of a company’s intricate web of business relationships, these events serve as a stark reminder that organizations are not isolated entities but rather hubs of interconnected and co-dependent partners and third parties. Achieving a robust cybersecurity posture requires more than individual efforts; it demands cultivating a secure ecosystem of thoroughly vetted trusted partners to effectively safeguard the entire supply chain required for product delivery (TPRM).

However, building such an ecosystem poses challenges. Many companies lack the resources to exclusively select leading, cutting-edge, and trusted third parties or may lack the leverage to demand transparency from existing partners.

Drawing lessons from the SolarWinds cyberattack, and amid heightened geopolitical tensions (see Chinese cyberattacks on U.S. infrastructure at an unprecedented scale), the Department of Defense recognized this challenge and responded with the development of a solution for securing the supply-chain ecosystem of the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) called the CMMC.

The Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) is a comprehensive framework designed to protect Federal Contract Information (FCI) and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), that is shared with contractors and subcontractors of the Department of Defense (DoD) through acquisition programs.

The CMMC 2.0 Proposed Rule Release, published on December 26, 2023, represents the latest evolution of the CMMC cybersecurity model, poised to supplant the preceding CMMC 1.0 with a more pragmatic approach. Following its release, the proposed policy underwent a 60-day open-comment period, which concluded on February 26, 2024. The new regulation is anticipated to be finalized by late 2024 or early 2025.

The CMMC 2.0 is aimed at safeguarding sensitive national security information by protecting the Defense Industrial Base’s (DIB) sensitive unclassified information from frequent and increasingly complex cyberattacks. It streamlines requirements to three levels of compliance and aligns the requirements at each level with well-known and widely accepted NIST cybersecurity standards. The specific security requirements and assessment types (self-assessment, third-party assessment, or DoD assessment) vary based on the level.

• Foundational (Level 1): Targets organizations handling FCI (e.g., contract performance reports, organizational charts). Compliance mandates strict adherence to the 15 security requirements outlined in FAR clause 52.204-21, through an annual self-assessment.
• Advanced (Level 2): Targets organizations handling CUI, including Controlled Technical Information, DoD Critical Infrastructure Security Information, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information, and Personally Identifiable Information (PIIs). Compliance requires adherence to 110 security requirements based on NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2. Assessments are conducted by third-party organizations known as CMMC Third Party Assessment Organizations (C3PAO) tri-annually or through an annual self-assessment, depending on the sensitivity of the underlying CUIs.
• Expert (Level 3): Targets organizations handling CUI for DoD programs with the highest priority. Compliance entails adhering to the 110 security requirements based on NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 and an additional 24 security requirements based on NIST SP 800-172. These organizations undergo tri-annual assessments conducted by the DoD’s Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Assessment Center (DIBCAC).

Organizations must obtain a CMMC Level 2 Final Certification before scheduling a DIBCAC assessment for CMMC Level 3.

The results of all assessments conducted on DIB organizations are consolidated within the Supplier Performance Risk System (SPRS). The SPRS (pronounced “Spurs”) is Department of Defense’s web platform that collects, processes, and retrieves data on supplier performance within the Defense Industrial Base, enabling the DoD to map the DIB’s business network cyber maturity, assess supplier performance, and evaluate risks related to contractual obligations.

By deploying this mandatory certification model, the DoD is at the forefront of establishing a comprehensive, secure, end-to-end supply chain framework within the DIB, hopefully enhancing long-term U.S. national security. Simultaneously, the DoD underscores that security is no longer optional; it is an integral aspect of business operations.

CMMC 2.0 assessments are expected to become available around Q4 2024 (once 32 CFR is finalized). Prime contractors will expect sub-contractors to achieve CMMC compliance before Q3 2025, when CMMC 2.0 takes effect. Starting October 1, 2025, CMMC certification will be mandatory at the time of contract award.

If you require assistance navigating the intricate landscape of CMMC 2.0 compliance or need support on your path to certification, #Wavestone is ready to empower your journey. Reach out today and elevate your cybersecurity readiness into a strategic advantage.

Cet article The DoD Strikes Back: Enhancing Supply Chain Cybersecurity with CMMC 2.0 est apparu en premier sur RiskInsight.

In response to industry feedback, including Wavestone’s continuous involvement in the framework development (see our most recent contributions here and here), NIST is now working hard to allow the guidelines to more easily apply to organizations, thanks to sector-specific “Profiles” (e.g., Manufacturing Profile released in September 2017).

The Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council (FSSCC) recently held a workshop hosted by NIST in Washington, D.C., to further develop the Financial Services Profile of the framework. It gathered not only industry members but also regulators such as the FED and the OCC. While it is still preliminary, here are few takeaways…

A new risk-tiering methodology

First and foremost, the profile introduces the concept of risk tiering similar to that of the FFIEC Cybersecurity Assessment Tool (CAT), but with qualitative rather than quantitative criteria. It proposes thirteen questions to determine the organization’s criticality level from 1 (Critical) to 4 (Relevant) based on criteria such as systemic importance, as well as geographical and geopolitical considerations. This criticality level then determines applicable “diagnostic statements” to assess.

The methodology aligns well with industry best practices and is tailored to financial services. However, the sequence of questions to determine an organization’s inherent risk is likely to have most if not all financial institutions rated at Level 1 or 2. For example, any organization collecting and/or managing end-consumer Personally Identifiable Information (PII) would be designated a Level 2: Significant risk. While coverage of PII and privacy in general is welcome in a context of increased privacy concerns, it may not be so relevant from an inherent risk perspective.

Qualitative assessments, such as the one proposed here, are relevant for smaller institutions, but bringing cybersecurity risk management practices closer in maturity to those of credit and market risk management would require leveraging quantitative assessment methodologies. The recent paper Cyber Risk for the Financial Sector: A Framework for Quantitative Assessment from an IMF economist points in that direction.

Significant changes to the Framework Core and diagnostic statements

The profile builds on to the Framework Core with two new functions: “Governance” and “Supply Chain/Dependency Management.” These additions put more emphasis on key areas, but at the cost of changing the well-known “Identify-Protect-Detect-Respond-Recover” structure, which is helpful for communicating with business and senior management.

The profile does not stop here, as it also increases the number of Categories and Subcategories, +8 and +20 respectively. While these additions are mostly relevant, they are not specific to Financial Services and could therefore be added to the Framework Core itself.

Based on this structure, the profile defines 300 diagnostic statements leveraging again the FFIEC CAT and other resources from NYS DFS, FSB, and CPMI-IOSCO.

More precise assessment criteria

When utilizing the NIST CSF, the FFIEC CAT, or any other generic framework or tool, most firms at some point end up defining specific potential answers to assessment criteria. Indeed, firms may have protection mechanisms in place, but they may not be consistently deployed across all assets. Similarly, while a measure may not yet be in place, a clear path forward may have been defined. Such scenarios are relevant to reflect an organization’s cybersecurity maturity.

The profile addresses this issue by proposing seven possible answers which successfully address common scenarios: “Not Applicable,” “Yes,” “Yes-Risk Based,” “Yes-Compensating Controls Used,” “Partial-Ongoing Project w/Action Plan,” “Not Tested,” and “No.” This addition is certainly an important step toward more consistent framework use and a foundation for maturity measures across organizations and across industries.

The need to think global

The proposed profile is currently presented as U.S.-centric. Indeed, most questions in the risk-tiering section and most diagnostic statement references relate to U.S. references. While this focus would be helpful for initial adoption in the U.S. market, it could be a barrier to expansion moving forward. Country-specific references are helpful, but the Profile itself should be kept as generic as possible, with U.S. references provided as add-ons only. FSSCC peers could then develop other add-ons at the country or region-level.

Moreover, the proposed profile must further address the challenge of managing different maturity levels across geographies. Given the pervasive nature of cyber risk, shouldn’t organizations ensure a consistent maturity across geographies unless sufficient segregation is ensured? As challenging as it sounds, the magnitude of risk certainly justifies this approach.

As regulations are introduced worldwide and organizations are more and more global, managing complexity and avoiding inconsistencies necessitate a common framework. The Financial Services Profile as intended by the FSSCC has an important role to play in this respect. More than a pragmatic approach to leverage the NIST CSF, it aims at greater regulatory harmonization and streamlined regulatory compliance efforts. It is laudable and certainly long-anticipated by organizations.

Cet article NIST and FSSCC Team Up for Financial Services Cybersecurity est apparu en premier sur RiskInsight.

Face à ce constat, les entreprises se sont rapidement interrogées sur les moyens de protection possibles.  Le marché s’est adapté. Aujourd’hui, deux stratégies se dessinent, entre solutions historiques manuelles et solutions novatrices hybrides (Cloud et/ou on-premise).

Une question se pose toutefois : la mise en œuvre d’une telle solution de protection, certes adaptée aux besoins, suffit-elle pour s’assurer d’une efficacité solide en cas d’attaque avérée ? La réponse est non !

Imaginez, vous avez subi pendant plusieurs jours les effets d’une attaque DDoS, avec des conséquences inacceptables pour le maintien de vos activités. Vous décidez de mettre en place une solution de protection ad hoc. Le projet démarre, vous choisissez une solution, elle est installée et fonctionne. Vous voilà enfin équipé d’une solution d’une efficacité prometteuse. Avec un simple ordre de bascule à donner à votre équipe de production ou à un fournisseur, la solution sera mise en route. Vous êtes confiant.

Activation, surveillance, désactivation : les 3 piliers d’une stratégie de protection anti DDoS

Pour autant, vous pourriez avoir oublié de répondre à un certain nombre de questions clés.

Sur quels critères de détection et à quels seuils serez-vous en mesure de passer l’ordre d’activation de la solution ? Serez-vous assez réactif pour qu’il ne soit pas trop tard vis-à-vis des impacts business ? L’échelle du temps DDoS est proche du ¼ d’heure… Une fois la solution activée, quelles seront les premières actions à entreprendre ? Avez-vous identifié ou contrôlerez-vous les effets de bord qu’elles pourront engendrer sur votre environnement de production ? Faudra-il communiquer aux clients, au réseau commercial ? Durant l’attaque, êtes-vous certain d’être apte à communiquer efficacement avec votre prestataire en charge de la solution ? Pourrez-vous aisément constater l’efficacité de ses services ? Connait-il votre contexte, votre infrastructure ? Est-il à jour des derniers changements pour éviter une protection partielle ? Par analogie avec l’ordre d’activation, saurez-vous quand et comment décider du retour à la normale ? Enfin, avez-vous suffisamment de visibilité pour déterminer si l’attaque continue ou non en amont des barrières défensives ?

Les retours d’expérience montrent que la mise en place d’une solution protectrice seule, sans réponse à l’ensemble de ces questions, ne suffit pas.

Aussi ne faut-il pas se cantonner à la simple souscription d’un service de protection : des moyens et des processus de détection, d’activation, de communication, d’arbitrage et retour à la normale devront être élaborés et régulièrement expérimentés. Les actions majeures devront être rigoureusement formalisées : le déclenchement de la solution de protection et le retour à la normale (qui décide, qui réalise, sur quelles informations, avec quelle réactivité…). Par ailleurs, le volet surveillance et gestion de crise pendant l’attaque ne doit pas être négligé (quels moyens pour vérifier que l’attaque a toujours lieu, avec quel effet, quels seuils/indicateurs pour déclencher les escalades).

Tests et exercices : les garant de la bonne gestion d’une attaque DDoS

Au-delà de la formalisation, trois types de tests s’avèrent indispensables.

Les plus simples sont les tests de « bascule à vide » : sans contrainte de temps particulière, il s’agit de mettre en action les différents modes opératoires liés à l’activation, au maintien ou à la désactivation de la solution de protection. Au-delà de permettre la formation des équipes concernées, ces tests permettent de juger la qualité des procédures techniques ; ils permettront également leur amélioration continue afin d’assurer au mieux leur efficacité en cas d’attaque.

Des tests de « bascule en conditions réelles » sont ensuite requis : à l’opposé de la « bascule à vide », une attaque simulée sera ici commanditée auprès d’un organisme tiers afin que les équipes techniques puissent s’exercer en conditions réelles. Les mêmes modes opératoires techniques seront mis à l’épreuve, dans un objectif cependant différent : le respect des échéances théoriques.

Des exercices de « gestion de crise » sont également à prévoir. Complémentaires des deux premières séries ci-dessus, il s’agit là de se focaliser sur l’expérimentation de la gestion de crise et non sur les aspects techniques. Ces tests permettront de juger la qualité de la gestion en répondant notamment aux bonnes questions en dehors de la sphère technique et en intégrant la communication, le juridique ou encore la relation clients. Chaque tâche trouve-t-elle rapidement son porteur ? L’ordonnancement prévu est-il respecté ? Les moyens nécessaires sont-ils accessibles (matériels, salles, interlocuteurs, etc.) ? Les rôles prédéfinis de chacun sont-ils connus de tous et à l’avance ? La remontée des informations au Responsable de crise est-elle correctement réalisée ?

Les solutions techniques ne peuvent suffire à gérer toutes les composantes d’une attaque DDos. Nécessaire et complémentaire, la mise en place d’une organisation interne apte à gérer l’attaque et la crise doit être considérée par les entreprises pour se protéger correctement et efficacement.

Cet article Lutte anti-DDoS : la technique ne suffit pas, organisons-nous ! est apparu en premier sur RiskInsight.

Une faille de sécurité critique Heartbleed a été identifiée dans les bibliothèques OpenSSL. Elle permet à un attaquant externe, non authentifié, de récupérer le contenu de la mémoire du serveur.

Les tests que nous avons menés ont montré qu’il était possible de récupérer les données échangées avec le serveur (dont les logins / mots de passe des utilisateurs), ainsi que des fichiers de configuration.

Recommandations

1- Nous recommandons dans un premier  temps de réaliser un inventaire des équipements utilisant ces bibliothèques, et de procéder à un test de vulnérabilité : soit par l’analyse de la version installée , soit via l’utilisation d’un script ;

2- Ensuite, d’appliquer les correctifs de sécurité ;

3- Il est également recommandé de considérer comme compromises les informations ayant transité par ces équipements, et de forcer un renouvellement des mots de passe (utilisateurs, serveurs, etc) ;

4- La clé privée du serveur pouvant également être impactée, il est recommandé de considérer la révocation et le renouvellement des certificats concernés, à minima sur les systèmes sensibles.

Produits concernés

•  OpenSSL 1.0.1 à 1.0.1f et OpenSSL 1.0.2-beta

•  Les branches 0.9.8 et 1.0.0 ne sont pas vulnérables

Attention, de nombreuses solutions packagées et appliances reposent sur ces bibliothèques et sont vulnérables : reverse proxy, passerelle VPN, etc.

Cet article sera complété dans les prochaines heures ; pour plus de précisions, vous pouvez contacter le CERT-Solucom.

Cet article Faille critique Heartbleed : recommandations du CERT-Solucom est apparu en premier sur RiskInsight.

Il est aujourd’hui nécessaire d’allier des mesures à la fois techniques et organisationnelles permettant de répondre à deux enjeux cruciaux : la détection (avant l’attaque) et la réaction (après l’attaque).

Un choix technologique et stratégique

Les mesures techniques visent à mettre en place une protection physique par le biais d’équipements de sécurité, pouvant s’opérer à deux niveaux : en amont du SI (au niveau des réseaux de l’opérateur) et directement en frontal (sur le site à protéger).

Plusieurs stratégies sont alors possibles :

• Une protection exclusivement manuelle : il s’agit de la mise en place de filtrages spécifiques par l’opérateur et de la configuration d’équipements de sécurité du SI. Cette stratégie à faible coût, pouvant être qualifiée de « protection par défaut », est aujourd’hui la plus communément utilisée.
• Un « boîtier anti-DDoS » en frontal : proche du SI, ce boîtier sert de « bouclier » et permet une protection immédiate, avec réinjection du trafic légitime. Il nécessite en revanche une expertise interne conséquente etpeut ainsi entraîner d’importants coûts récurrents, en plus des coûts liés à l’investissement . De plus, sans protection en amont du SI, le niveau de protection offert par le boîtier face aux attaques volumétriques est limité à la capacité du lien réseau qui le précède. Utilisé seul, un tel boîtier montre rapidement ses limites.

• Une protection Cloud, en amont : située dans le Cloud ou le réseau opérateur, cette protection permet de bénéficier d’un service et d’une expertise externalisés. Grâce à ses mécanismes de redirection ponctuelle ou permanente, de nettoyage du trafic et de réinjection, elle permet la gestion d’attaques à forte volumétrie. Cette solution entraîne en revanche des coûts élevés et ne permet pas de se protéger contre l’ensemble des différents types d’attaques.

• Une stratégie hybride : il s’agit ici d’allier deux des trois premières stratégies, à savoir une protection distante dite « Cloud » et un boîtier physique, en frontal du SI. Malgré un coût logiquement le plus élevé, les avantages viennent s’additionner et permettent de faire face à l’évolution de la menace. Les attaques à la fois volumétriques et par saturation de table d’état, aux niveaux réseau ou applicatif peuvent ici être maîtrisées et la continuité du service est assurée.

Ce choix de stratégie reste complexe et diffèrera évidemment d’une entreprise à l’autre en fonction des besoins en matière de sécurité. Il dépendra en effet de son niveau d’exposition à la menace et de la gravité des impacts en cas d’attaque.

Des réponses également organisationnelles

Au-delà de la protection physique, il est important d’acquérir un certain nombre de bonnes pratiques permettant une gestion de crise optimale en cas d’attaque.

Ces mesures organisationnelles peuvent être classées en trois étapes chronologiques :

Bien qu’elles soient aujourd’hui démocratisées, inévitables pour la plupart et parfois ravageuses, les attaques par déni de service distribué engendrent des impacts pouvant être relativement maîtrisés, pourvu que la question de la protection ait été traitée à temps par l’entreprise.

Malheureusement, force est de constater que peu d’entreprises ont aujourd’hui procédé à l’acquisition d’une protection adaptée à la menace cybercriminelle actuelle.

L’actualité forte dans ce domaine les sensibilise néanmoins et sera sans doute un catalyseur de la mise en place de ces mesures

Cet article DDoS, quelle stratégie de protection ? est apparu en premier sur RiskInsight.