<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>VincentFerrie, Auteur</title>
	<atom:link href="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/en/author/vincentferrie/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/author/vincentferrie/</link>
	<description>The cybersecurity &#38; digital trust blog by Wavestone&#039;s consultants</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Mon, 29 Nov 2021 08:34:51 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	

 
	<item>
		<title>The C.L.O.U.D. Act: How to make the data “un-territorial”?</title>
		<link>https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/en/2021/11/the-c-l-o-u-d-act-how-to-make-the-data-un-territorial/</link>
					<comments>https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/en/2021/11/the-c-l-o-u-d-act-how-to-make-the-data-un-territorial/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[VincentFerrie]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 03 Nov 2021 18:28:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Cloud & Next-Gen IT Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Focus]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[3034]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[3208]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[3383]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cloud]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[digital privacy]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/?p=17272</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In 2013, the FBI issued a Stored Communications Act warrant for emails stored in Ireland, on one of Microsoft’s datacenters as part of a drug trafficking investigation. Microsoft refused to provide this information, because the data in Ireland is beyond...</p>
<p>Cet article <a href="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/en/2021/11/the-c-l-o-u-d-act-how-to-make-the-data-un-territorial/">The C.L.O.U.D. Act: How to make the data “un-territorial”?</a> est apparu en premier sur <a href="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/en/">RiskInsight</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>In 2013, the FBI issued a Stored Communications Act warrant for emails stored in Ireland, on one of Microsoft’s datacenters as part of a drug trafficking investigation. Microsoft refused to provide this information, because the data in Ireland is beyond the jurisdiction of the warrant. In Microsoft Corp. v. United States, the court held that “<a href="https://harvardlawreview.org/2016/12/microsoft-corp-v-united-states/">the government cannot compel Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to turn over data stored overseas, even with a warrant</a>”.</p>
<p>To address this issue, the US government decided in 2018 to amend the Stored Communications Act of 1986 by enacting the C.L.O.U.D. Act.</p>
<p>The C.L.O.U.D. Act stands for <strong>Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act</strong>, a federal law to <strong>speed access to electronic information</strong> held by providers under the US jurisdiction that is critical to US foreign partners’ <strong>investigations of serious crimes.</strong></p>
<p><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-17273" src="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/cloud-act-1-en.png" alt="" width="1573" height="301" srcset="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/cloud-act-1-en.png 1573w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/cloud-act-1-en-437x84.png 437w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/cloud-act-1-en-71x14.png 71w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/cloud-act-1-en-768x147.png 768w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/cloud-act-1-en-1536x294.png 1536w" sizes="(max-width: 1573px) 100vw, 1573px" /></p>
<p>Scope of accessible Data through the C.L.O.U.D act:</p>
<ul>
<li>Content of electronic communications in electronic storage</li>
<li>Content of electronic communications on a remote computing service</li>
<li>Records relating to an electronic communications service or a remote computing service</li>
</ul>
<h2>A controlled process for accessing the data.</h2>
<p>First, the US authorities invoking this law to request content from all companies under US jurisdiction must <strong>obtain a warrant. They must prove a high likelihood of finding evidence</strong>, related to the ongoing criminal investigation, in the targeted data,<strong> whether the crime is perpetrated by the client or the company itself.</strong></p>
<p>Once the warrant is issued, it must be reviewed and approved <strong>by an independent judge</strong>.</p>
<p><strong>The request can be issued under orders of secrecy</strong>: the legal authorities can delay the CSP (Cloud Solution Provider) from notifying the account holder of the request. Orders of secrecy are examined more carefully by the Department of Justice.</p>
<p>If the warrant is approved and a request is issued, the Service Provider or the client, if notified, can challenge it <strong>within 14 days</strong> if:</p>
<ul>
<li>The data relates to a non-US person who does not reside in the United States, and/or;</li>
<li>The request would lead to disregard the legislation of a foreign country and would expose it to sanctions.</li>
</ul>
<p>Factors such as the importance of the information, the specificity of the request or the availability of alternative means to obtain the information will be analysed by the court.</p>
<p><img decoding="async" class="aligncenter  wp-image-17275" src="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/cloud-act-2-en.png" alt="" width="496" height="406" srcset="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/cloud-act-2-en.png 891w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/cloud-act-2-en-233x191.png 233w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/cloud-act-2-en-48x39.png 48w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/cloud-act-2-en-768x628.png 768w" sizes="(max-width: 496px) 100vw, 496px" /></p>
<h2>C.L.O.U.D. Act = Cloud provider?</h2>
<p>C.L.O.U.D. does not target only Cloud Service Providers! C.L.O.U.D. Act <strong>scope is wider than Cloud Providers</strong> and <strong>include some Software and Providers</strong> <strong>already deployed in some companies’ IS.</strong></p>
<p><span style="background-color: #ffffff;"><strong><img decoding="async" class="aligncenter  wp-image-17283" src="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-3-clud-applicable-en.png" alt="" width="751" height="101" srcset="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-3-clud-applicable-en.png 974w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-3-clud-applicable-en-437x59.png 437w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-3-clud-applicable-en-71x10.png 71w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-3-clud-applicable-en-768x103.png 768w" sizes="(max-width: 751px) 100vw, 751px" /></strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Remote Computing Services (RCS)</strong><strong>:</strong> any service that provides computer storage and processing services to users through an electronic communication system.</li>
<li><strong>Electronic Communication Service (ECS)</strong><strong>:</strong> any service that provides its users with the ability to send or receive communications by wire or electronic means.</li>
</ul>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter  wp-image-17279" src="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-3-bis-clud-applicable-en.png" alt="" width="758" height="101" srcset="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-3-bis-clud-applicable-en.png 973w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-3-bis-clud-applicable-en-437x58.png 437w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-3-bis-clud-applicable-en-71x9.png 71w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-3-bis-clud-applicable-en-768x103.png 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 758px) 100vw, 758px" /></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>US companies </strong></li>
<li><strong>Foreign companies located outside of the U.S. but providing services in the US with sufficient contacts </strong>depending on the nature, quantity, and quality of the company’s contacts with the US (promotion to US customers, solicitation of business to US companies, usage by US clients, etc.</li>
</ul>
<p>Besides the obvious scope of the RCS and ECS definition (Email providers, cell phone companies, social media platforms, cloud storage services, etc.), many softwares and providers used in most IS are in the C.L.O.U.D. Act scope:</p>
<ul>
<li>All Microsoft Office suite (Outlook, Skype).</li>
<li>Security and network appliances and services (proxies, firewalls, anti-malware, etc.) provided by U.S. companies (e.g., Symantec, Pulse, Citrix, etc.).</li>
<li>Business softwares that process business workflows to US companies or citizens (e.g.: payment orders).</li>
</ul>
<h2>In On-Premise IS, the C.L.O.U.D Act still apply.</h2>
<p>The C.L.O.U.D. Act is wider than common expectations and on-premise implementation can give a false perception of protection. Here are two examples of how the data can be retrieved or transmitted:</p>
<h3><strong>1. Built-in technical outgoing flows</strong></h3>
<p>Many software communicate by design with the provider’s infrastructure (error and user reports, telemetry data). Most of the outgoing flows are encrypted through HTTPS but providers usually <strong>do not communicate on the content of the data sent nor precise the destination</strong> and, in most cases, these outgoing flows are required to use the service and <strong>cannot be disabled</strong>.</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-17277" src="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/cloud-act-3-en.png" alt="" width="383" height="48" srcset="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/cloud-act-3-en.png 383w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/cloud-act-3-en-71x9.png 71w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 383px) 100vw, 383px" /></p>
<p>=&gt; The US authorities can retrieve data desired for the Cloud Act such as individual login, client’s workflows, etc.</p>
<h3><strong>2. Foreign Third-party support</strong></h3>
<p>Support teams are performed remotely allowing access from provider teams all around the world (included US territory).</p>
<p>For numerous softwares, providers <strong>bring foreign support team that can be US-based or under US jurisdiction.</strong></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-17247" src="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-cloud-4.png" alt="" width="264" height="81" srcset="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-cloud-4.png 264w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-cloud-4-71x22.png 71w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 264px) 100vw, 264px" /></p>
<p>=&gt; The provider or the third party must be compelled to transmit the data in case of a request from the U.S.</p>
<h2>What do the Cloud Service Providers say about it?</h2>
<p>Cloud Service Providers assure their customers that they will not disclose their data unless they are obliged to do so by law… which is the case if they are compelled by the C.L.O.U.D. Act. In the event of a conflict of laws, such as with the GDPR, CSP further assure that they will <strong>take the necessary steps to oppose the US government’s request</strong>.</p>
<p>Some of them go even further, by assuring that the encryption keys used to secure client data or the ability to force the encryption will not be provided. For now, <strong>the C.L.O.U.D. Act does not mention encryption keys</strong> nor obliged to provide unencrypted data.</p>
<p>Twice a year, <strong>Cloud Service Providers such as </strong><a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/corporate-responsibility/law-enforcement-requests-report"><strong>Microsoft</strong></a><strong>, </strong><a href="https://d1.awsstatic.com/certifications/Information_Request_Report_December_2020.pdf"><strong>Amazon</strong></a><strong> and Google</strong><strong> publish the number of law enforcement requests concerning customer data they receive</strong>. Those reports compile all the requests issued by law enforcement agencies all over the world. The law enforcement requests issued by the United States of America include C.L.O.U.D act related requests. The distribution of the laws used to issue the requests is not specified, meaning we cannot know which proportion of requests are C.L.O.U.D Act related.</p>
<h3>Type of data retrieved</h3>
<p>The last Microsoft and Amazon reports, for requests between July and December 2020 in the world can  provide more information concerning the type of data requested to Microsoft and Amazon (Google does not provide information concerning the distinction between content and non-content data):</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter  wp-image-17249" src="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-5-cloud-act.png" alt="" width="788" height="306" srcset="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-5-cloud-act.png 946w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-5-cloud-act-437x170.png 437w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-5-cloud-act-71x28.png 71w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-5-cloud-act-768x298.png 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 788px) 100vw, 788px" /></p>
<p><span style="color: #00ccff;">% Content <span style="color: #808080;">:</span></span> is what customers create, communicate and store on or through services such as the words in an email or the documents stored on OneDrive</p>
<p><span style="color: #ffcc00;">% Non-Content </span>: include basic information such as email address, name, country and IP at time of registration, IP connection history or billing information</p>
<p><strong>% No data found</strong>: when the data required by the mandate cannot be found</p>
<p><span style="background-color: #ffffff; color: #ff0000;">% Rejected</span> when unable to disclose the requested information (not meeting legal requirements)</p>
<p><strong>=&gt; 40% of requests to Microsoft are unsuccessful</strong>: no data is found, or the request is rejected.</p>
<p><strong>=&gt; Most requests</strong> to Microsoft and AWS resulting in the disclosure of data <strong>are for non-content data</strong> (mostly login data).</p>
<h2>Closer look</h2>
<p>Let us deep dive into Microsoft and Google reports as Amazon does not provide as much detail. The <strong>Google services</strong> concerned by the requests are <strong>Youtube, Gmail, Google Voice and Blogger. The Microsoft services</strong> concerned by the requests are <strong>Outlook, Skype, O365, Xbox, AZURE, etc.</strong></p>
<p>In a geographical point of view, we can identify countries that are the most concerned by those requests for the second semester of 2020 :</p>
<p><strong>Microsoft</strong></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter  wp-image-17251" src="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-6-cloud-act.png" alt="" width="547" height="425" srcset="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-6-cloud-act.png 4075w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-6-cloud-act-246x191.png 246w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-6-cloud-act-50x39.png 50w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-6-cloud-act-768x597.png 768w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-6-cloud-act-1536x1193.png 1536w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-6-cloud-act-2048x1591.png 2048w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 547px) 100vw, 547px" /></p>
<p><strong>Google</strong></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter  wp-image-17253" src="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-7-cloud-act.png" alt="" width="529" height="409" srcset="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-7-cloud-act.png 4098w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-7-cloud-act-247x191.png 247w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-7-cloud-act-50x39.png 50w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-7-cloud-act-768x593.png 768w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-7-cloud-act-1536x1187.png 1536w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-7-cloud-act-2048x1582.png 2048w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 529px) 100vw, 529px" /></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Only few countries are concerned by most of the requests:</strong>
<ul>
<li><strong>For Microsoft : </strong><strong>6</strong> <strong>countries</strong> have been concerned by 900 requests or more in S2 2020 which <strong>represent more than 77%</strong> of the overall requests</li>
<li><strong>For Google </strong><strong>11 countries </strong>have been concerned by more than 900 requests in S2 2020 which <strong>represent more than 90% </strong>of the overall requests</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><strong>France authorities are at the 4<sup>th</sup> place of each Provider regarding requests issuance</strong> :
<ul>
<li>For Microsoft 10% of the requests are issued by the French authorities</li>
<li>For Google 8% of the requests are issued by the French authorities</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Additionally, we can analyse the number of requests which end up in data being disclosed to the authorities and which proportion of the total requests it represents. <strong>In the rest of the article, data disclosure means that the authorities have received data following their requests.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Microsoft </strong></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter  wp-image-17255" src="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-8-cloud-act.png" alt="" width="662" height="358" srcset="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-8-cloud-act.png 5342w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-8-cloud-act-353x191.png 353w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-8-cloud-act-71x39.png 71w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-8-cloud-act-768x415.png 768w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-8-cloud-act-1536x830.png 1536w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-8-cloud-act-2048x1107.png 2048w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 662px) 100vw, 662px" /></p>
<p><strong>Google</strong></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter  wp-image-17257" src="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-9-cloud-act.png" alt="" width="637" height="344" srcset="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-9-cloud-act.png 5348w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-9-cloud-act-353x191.png 353w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-9-cloud-act-71x39.png 71w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-9-cloud-act-768x415.png 768w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-9-cloud-act-1536x830.png 1536w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-9-cloud-act-2048x1107.png 2048w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 637px) 100vw, 637px" /></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>The percentage of Law enforcement requests which lead to data disclosure is quite similar for Microsoft and Google and contained between 50%-75% (</strong><strong>Microsoft) and between 55%-88% (Google)</strong></li>
<li>However, there are some disparities regarding the Country. For example <strong>French authorities have gained access to data in 52% of their requests for Microsoft </strong>whereas they have gained access to data in<strong> 83% of their requests for Google</strong></li>
</ul>
<p>Seeing the raw data, one can at first sight conclude that data disclosure to authorities is more likely for Google service than Microsoft ones. <strong>It can be explained by the fact that Google services are aimed more towards individuals than businesses and Google services are more widely used</strong> (Outlook 400 million users versus Gmail 1,5 billion users). Additionally, <strong>the law enforcement requests </strong>are issued in criminal cases which<strong> are more likely to concern individuals </strong>meaning those requests are more likely to be send to Google.</p>
<h3>Step back &#8211; How the law enforcement requests have evolved since 2013 for Google and Microsoft?</h3>
<p>If we compile reports since 2013, we can identify trends regarding data disclosure following C.LO.U.D Act implementation.</p>
<p><strong>Microsoft </strong></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter  wp-image-17259" src="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-10-cloud-act.png" alt="" width="571" height="358" srcset="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-10-cloud-act.png 5346w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-10-cloud-act-304x191.png 304w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-10-cloud-act-62x39.png 62w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-10-cloud-act-768x483.png 768w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-10-cloud-act-1536x965.png 1536w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-10-cloud-act-2048x1287.png 2048w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 571px) 100vw, 571px" /></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter  wp-image-17261" src="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-11-cloud-act.png" alt="" width="541" height="340" srcset="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-11-cloud-act.png 5346w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-11-cloud-act-304x191.png 304w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-11-cloud-act-62x39.png 62w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-11-cloud-act-768x483.png 768w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-11-cloud-act-1536x965.png 1536w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-11-cloud-act-2048x1287.png 2048w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 541px) 100vw, 541px" /></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter  wp-image-17263" src="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-12-cloud-act.png" alt="" width="564" height="324" srcset="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-12-cloud-act.png 5346w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-12-cloud-act-332x191.png 332w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-12-cloud-act-68x39.png 68w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-12-cloud-act-120x70.png 120w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-12-cloud-act-768x442.png 768w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-12-cloud-act-1536x884.png 1536w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-12-cloud-act-2048x1178.png 2048w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 564px) 100vw, 564px" /></p>
<p><em>It is worth noting that in the Microsoft report, the requests which are rejected and requests approved but in which no data is discovered are classified in the category “Data request leading to no data being disclosed”</em></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>The total number of requests seems to stabilise around 20K-25K each semester</strong> since S2 2016, the same for the account/users concerned, around 40K-50K.</li>
<li><strong>Distribution tends to evolve, notabily regarding rejected requests</strong> :
<ul>
<li>A small part concerns Content data, generally aound 5% of the requests</li>
<li>More than half are requests for non-content data</li>
<li>An approxymately equal share of 15% each semester are requests for which data have not been found</li>
<li><strong>Rejected requests have been growing since 2013 to reach almost a quarter of the request results</strong></li>
<li><strong>In total more than 40% of the requests lead to no data being disclosed to the authorities</strong></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Google </strong></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter  wp-image-17265" src="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-13-CA.png" alt="" width="568" height="322" srcset="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-13-CA.png 5342w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-13-CA-337x191.png 337w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-13-CA-69x39.png 69w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-13-CA-768x435.png 768w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-13-CA-1536x871.png 1536w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-13-CA-2048x1161.png 2048w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 568px) 100vw, 568px" /></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter  wp-image-17267" src="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-14-CA.png" alt="" width="569" height="335" srcset="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-14-CA.png 1246w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-14-CA-325x191.png 325w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-14-CA-66x39.png 66w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-14-CA-120x70.png 120w, https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/image-14-CA-768x452.png 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 569px) 100vw, 569px" /></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>The total number of requests has been exponentially growing since 2018 to reach more than a 100k requests for the first semester</strong>. This can be explained by the increased number of countries which are included in the google reports (68 in 2013 versus 85 in 2020), the omipresence of Google services in any indivuals’ connected life as well as the release of the C.L.O.U.D Act in 2018.</li>
<li>The evolution of requests tends towards the increase in data disclosure starting in 2018 and <strong>the release of the C.L.O.U.D Act. However, since the beginning of the reports publication in 2013, the percentage of the data disclosure has always been between three and four fifth.</strong></li>
</ul>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>After analysis of the bigger picture, all CSPs are not in the same situation:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Amazon does not provide any detailed information regarding data disclosed location or percentage of data disclosed on overall requests</strong></li>
<li><strong>Google receives more law enforcement requests than Microsoft</strong> and discloses more often information than Microsoft <strong>that can be explained by the fact that Google services are aimed more towards individuals than businesses</strong></li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Nevertheless, the decision to disclose the information is in the hands of the legal institutions and not the CSPs’ </strong>(even if it can contest the request)<strong>. Therefore, the CSPs’ cannot be held responsible for the amount of data they disclose to the authorities through legal means.</strong></p>
<p>Additionally, even if <strong>law enforcement requests</strong> are over thousands every semester and tens of thousands of users, this <strong>remain a tiny part of the total amount data treated</strong> by main Cloud Providers. The<strong> data access procedure remains exceptional</strong>. <strong>The requests mainly concern logins and metadata, there is no proven case of industrialized espionage with mass data recovery.</strong></p>
<p>Finally, keep in mind that<strong> these statistics cannot be challenged or aggregated with other sources</strong>. It is necessary to underline that <strong>this is only at the goodwill of the Cloud Service Providers</strong> to disclose the data and the reports, so it should be taken with a grain of salt.</p>
<p>At least,<strong> the notion of trusted Cloud</strong> <strong>remains key</strong> for every Companies, Cloud Providers as well as authorities tend to get more involved into the subject as evidenced by the <strong>Thales and Google new partnership to build a sovereign Cloud Offer or the planned evolution of ANSSI&#8217;s SecNumCloud qualification.</strong></p>
<p>Cet article <a href="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/en/2021/11/the-c-l-o-u-d-act-how-to-make-the-data-un-territorial/">The C.L.O.U.D. Act: How to make the data “un-territorial”?</a> est apparu en premier sur <a href="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/en/">RiskInsight</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/en/2021/11/the-c-l-o-u-d-act-how-to-make-the-data-un-territorial/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Cybersécurité au cinéma&#160;: la fiction est-elle à la hauteur de la réalité ?</title>
		<link>https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/en/2014/08/cybersecurite-au-cinema-fiction-hauteur-realite/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[VincentFerrie]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Aug 2014 07:52:38 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Cybersecurity & Digital Trust]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.solucominsight.fr/?p=5675</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Extrait du synopsis du film Firewall : « Cadre supérieur d&#8217;une grande banque de Seattle, il a mis au point un &#8220;pare-feu&#8221; ultrasophistiqué, qu&#8217;aucun hacker n&#8217;a jamais réussi à pénétrer. Depuis plusieurs mois, sa famille est espionnée à son insu par un...</p>
<p>Cet article <a href="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/en/2014/08/cybersecurite-au-cinema-fiction-hauteur-realite/">Cybersécurité au cinéma&nbsp;: la fiction est-elle à la hauteur de la réalité ?</a> est apparu en premier sur <a href="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/en/">RiskInsight</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Extrait du synopsis du film Firewall : « Cadre supérieur d&#8217;une grande banque de Seattle, il a mis au point un &#8220;pare-feu&#8221; ultrasophistiqué, qu&#8217;aucun hacker n&#8217;a jamais réussi à pénétrer. Depuis plusieurs mois, sa famille est espionnée à son insu par un chef de bande aussi ingénieux que déterminé. »</em></p>
<div id="blogvision"><iframe loading="lazy" style="width: 480px; height: 270px;" src="http://www.allocine.fr/_video/iblogvision.aspx?cmedia=18413224" width="320" height="240"></iframe><br />
<a href="http://www.allocine.fr/film/fichefilm_gen_cfilm=56885.html" target="_blank">Firewall</a></div>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><em>Sceptique ? Votre banquier n’a pas les mêmes capacités qu’Harrison Ford ? Entre mythe et réalité, revue des concepts de la cybersécurité au cinéma.</em></p>
<h2>L’image du hacker : cool et sexy</h2>
<p>Tapant plus vite que son ombre et utilisant un maximum de termes techniques dans la même phrase (un savant mélange de « chiffrement », « pare-feu » et « adresse IP »), le hacker est un personnage type du cinéma défini par un certain nombre de caractéristiques : un anti-héros intelligent, solitaire et en décalage avec la réalité, contrastant avec les gros bras musclés du cinéma des années 80 (imaginez Clint Eastwood ranger son Magnum pour pianoter sur son clavier d’ordinateur).</p>
<p>Néo, personnage principal de Matrix, en est le parfait exemple : programmeur de jour, hacker de nuit, reconnu pour ses talents au point de se faire remarquer par Morpheus. Dans un style plus punk, et amplifiant par un autre cliché la caractéristique antisociale du hacker,<a title="Wikipedia - Lisbeth Salander" href="http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lisbeth_Salander" target="_blank"> Lisbeth Salander dans Millenium</a> est un archétype du personnage : elle survit grâce à ses talents en piratage informatique. Une enfance chaotique, une vie sociale inexistante en dehors de son ordinateur et une certaine aversion pour la violence.</p>
<p>Si on retire l’image caricaturale du hacker, Hollywood dépeint surtout le côté hacktiviste du hacker, qui milite pour ses idéaux au travers d’actions visibles et politisées. Et notons d’ailleurs que les hacktivistes lui renvoient l’ascenseur : le symbole des hacktivistes est clairement inspiré du film V pour Vendetta (le masque est tout de même plus joli que celui de Zorro). Clairement, les attaquants aux cibles purement lucratives  (vols de données personnelles, vols de cartes bancaires… à l’image des attaques subies par Target aux États-Unis ou encore Orange en France) sont beaucoup moins représentés à l’écran</p>
<p>Le cinéma a donc une vision idéaliste, et avouons-le beaucoup plus « sexy » du hacker, plus proche du héros hollywoodien se battant pour ses idées que d’une bande organisée utilisant ses talents informatiques dans un objectif de gain.</p>
<h2>Cyberguerre, terrorisme, impacts majeurs… le cinéma dans la surenchère !</h2>
<p>Première règle d’un film Hollywoodien : il faut que ça « explose de partout ». Les attaques cybercriminelles au cinéma ne font pas exception à la règle : « une ligne de code peut être dévastatrice », pourrait en résumer la bande annonce. Cependant, même si ces attaques sont clairement amplifiées par la magie des effets spéciaux, Hollywood n’est finalement pas si éloigné que ça des attaques réelles.</p>
<p>Prenons <a title="Allociné - Die Hard IV, retour en enfer" href="http://www.allocine.fr/film/fichefilm_gen_cfilm=50575.html" target="_blank">Die Hard 4 </a>où les dangers du tout connecté sont mis en scène quand un virus contamine le système d’information national des États-Unis (communications, transports, énergies, etc.). Vague de chaos sur le pays, et une fois de plus seul Bruce Willis est en mesure de sauver le pays (en explosant une voiture sur un hélicoptère. certes). Sabotages, attaques de systèmes industriels, pollution du programme nucléaire… <a title="SolucomINSIGHT - De « I Love You » à « Blaster », va-t-on voir un retour des codes malveillants du passé ?" href="http://www.solucominsight.fr/2014/02/de-i-love-you-a-blaster-va-t-on-voir-un-retour-des-codes-malveillants-du-passe/" target="_blank">Stuxnet ou Havex</a> n’auraient-ils finalement pas eu leur place dans le film ? Clairement les attaques réelles montrent à quel point une attaque informatique peut désormais avoir des impacts et des répercussions économiques et industrielles importantes, et la réalité n’est pas si éloignée de la fiction.</p>
<p>Et si on continuait dans la surenchère ? Autant s’attaquer directement aux institutions gouvernementales ! Et à ce sujet, comment ne pas citer James Bond et Jack Bauer ? Rappelez-vous : dans<a title="YouTube - Skyfall MI6 Explosion" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rh_us78fTlI" target="_blank"> Skyfall, le siège du MI6 explose à la suite d’une intrusion dans le système d’information des services secrets</a>, et dans la dernière saison de 24, des drones militaires sont détournés suite à une attaque informatique. Si de telles attaques n’ont heureusement jamais eu lieu en réalité, les attaques réelles n’épargnent pas vraiment les institutions ! <a title="France Culture - L'Elysée cible d'une attaque informatique en mai 2012" href="http://www.franceculture.fr/emission-journal-de-22h-l-elysee-cible-d-une-attaque-informatique-en-mai-2012-2013-10-25" target="_blank">L’Élysée n’a t-il pas été victime d’attaques informatiques</a> à plusieurs reprises ?</p>
<p>Espérons à ce stade que le cinéma n’est pas totalement visionnaire… comme il le fut pour l’affaire Snowden ! En effet, Ennemi d’État racontait dès 1998 la traque d’un homme en possession de documents confidentiels de la NSA. 15 ans plus tard, la réalité a clairement dépassé la fiction, et les moyens d’espionnage utilisés par la NSA dans le film sont finalement très crédibles.</p>
<h2>L’humain au cœur de la cybercriminalité</h2>
<p>Les techniques d’attaques sont  probablement un des sujets casse-tête des réalisateurs. Un personnage écrivant des lignes de code sur son ordinateur risque rapidement de faire fuir les téléspectateurs. Et c’est pourquoi, mis à part quelques rares exceptions (comment ne pas évoquer <a title="YouTube - Nmap Matrix" href="http://youtu.be/0TJuipCrjZQ" target="_blank">nmap utilisé plusieurs fois dans Matrix</a>), le cinéma préfère clairement se focaliser sur les personnages à l’origine des attaques et non sur la technique.</p>
<p>Dès 1995,<a title="Allociné - Hackers" href="http://www.allocine.fr/film/fichefilm_gen_cfilm=45062.html" target="_blank"> Hackers</a> (cultissime !) illustrait parfaitement l’exploitation du facteur humain dans les attaques informatiques. Dans ce film, une poignée de protagonistes se faisaient passer pour des réparateurs informatiques afin de s’introduire dans le système d’information d’une entreprise. Le réalisateur pourrait exiger des copyrights : en 2013, cette technique d’ingénierie sociale a été utilisée par des cybercriminels se faisant passer pour des membres du support informatique pour infiltrer la banque Barclays et détourner près de 1,25 millions de livres. Et si vous recherchez une définition précise de l’ingénierie sociale, inutile d’ouvrir un dictionnaire, visionnez plutôt <a title="Allocine - Catch me if you can" href="http://www.allocine.fr/film/fichefilm_gen_cfilm=35973.html" target="_blank">Catch Me If You Can</a>, un vrai film de hacker … sans aucune attaque informatique !</p>
<p><span style="line-height: 1.5em;">Continuons sur l’importance du facteur humain à Hollywood. En cherchant bien, on peut même trouver un enseignement dans Jurassic Park. En effet, le point de départ de l’intrigue est la désactivation du système de sécurité par un programmeur du parc pour s’emparer d’un échantillon d’ADN et le revendre. Certes, avec moins de dinosaures mais autant d’argent, les exemples d’attaques dont l’origine provient d’un employé malveillant, frustré ou appâté par le gain sont multiples. Maîtriser les comptes à privilèges, n’est-ce pas une des bases de la cybersécurité ?</span><br />
<iframe loading="lazy" src="http://www.criticalcommons.org/Members/ccManager/clips/jurassicparkhackerstereotype.mp4/embed_view" width="300" height="219" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>En conclusion</h2>
<p>Le hacker reste au cinéma un héros hollywoodien comme un autre : il ne doit pas être proche de la réalité, seulement correspondre à la représentation collective admise. Et il faut du spectacle et du suspense : une intrusion dans un système d’information pour voler des informations est moins distrayante qu’une attaque explosive sur tout Manhattan. Les films sur la cybersécurité respectent les codes du cinéma. Inutile de chercher trop d’enseignement dans ces films, même si certaines situations nous rappellent aujourd’hui clairement que la réalité rattrape la fiction.</p>
<p>Après le cinéma, c’est désormais au tour de la télévision et des jeux vidéos de sortir leurs blockbusters cybersécurité. Impossible en effet de conclure cet article sans évoquer <a title="Ubisoft - Watchdogs" href="http://watchdogs.ubi.com/watchdogs/fr-fr/home/" target="_blank">le phénomène Watchdogs</a>, ou l’arrivée prochaine de la nouvelle série Les Experts-Cyber, qui risque de nous fournir encore quelques belles répliques. « Je vais la distraire. Ping son adresse IP pour la localiser ».</p>
<p>Cet article <a href="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/en/2014/08/cybersecurite-au-cinema-fiction-hauteur-realite/">Cybersécurité au cinéma&nbsp;: la fiction est-elle à la hauteur de la réalité ?</a> est apparu en premier sur <a href="https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/en/">RiskInsight</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
