To this end, there are many existing rights models: MAC, DAC, GBAC, ABAC, etc.

How do you understand these many different rights models in practical terms and apply them to your business?

The models differ in their degree of complexity and in the response they provide to the specific needs and constraints of an organisation or system. The most recent models incorporate issues of security, scalability and compliance in an increasingly complex technological environment.

In this article, we will follow a chronological logic, identifying how authorisation has evolved over the decades to meet the challenges faced by organisations. We will see that, like information systems, rights model approaches have become increasingly complex and now include more and more parameters for deciding whether to grant or deny access.

Models can be grouped into 3 approaches reflecting their progressive sophistication:

– Classic approach: admin-time

– Modern approach: run-time

– Forward-looking approaches: event-time

We will illustrate each of these approaches with emblematic models, highlighting:

1) The response to an initial need

2) The limitations of the model

We conclude with a chronological summary of the approaches and their models.

Classic authorisation approaches: Admin-time

In the 60s and 70s the development of computer systems, marked by the development of the first multi-user systems (Multics, HP-3000), gave rise to the need to rethink user rights.

Innovative security principles, which are still used today, were defined for these systems such as rings of protection, which aim to protect the integrity of the operating system against deliberate and accidental modifications and initiate a rethink of user access policies to resources.

In the first access rights models to emerge, the management of rights remained summary, defined in hard terms by ‘administrators’: this was admin-time, of which the DAC and MAC (60s-70s) and RBAC (90s) models are particularly noteworthy.

Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and Access Control Lists (ACLs)

As its name suggests, the DAC model – for ‘discretionary access control’ – leaves it up to each resource owner to assign permissions to users. This is the basic rights model found on Unix systems, which can be supplemented by the ACL mechanism, or ‘access control lists’. Often associated with DAC, ACLs specify, for a given resource, the users and their rights over the resource, as illustrated below using the Unix example.

Beyond Unix, file-sharing systems such as OneDrive and social networks, where the user can choose who can view or comment on each publication, are other examples of the use of DACs and ACLs.

In fact, the flexibility and granularity of this model are an advantage for local implementations centred on individuals. On the other hand, they become problematic for ensuring a correct level of resource protection on a large scale in more complex systems.

Mandatory Access Control (MAC)

The MAC model, which stands for Mandatory Access Control, is the opposite of DAC. Rather than leaving the assignment of rights to the ‘discretion’ of individual users, resource by resource, limiting system-wide visibility and encouraging errors and vulnerabilities, rules are predefined by administrators according to different security classifications and strictly enforced by a central authority, generally represented by the operating system itself.

It is particularly prevalent in government, military and industrial environments, because it allows tight control over access to sensitive data. It uses labels that characterise the sensitivity of objects and users, according to the rules of the organisation concerned:

– A resource classification level, for example: ‘Unclassified’, ‘Restricted’, ‘Confidential’, etc.

– A level of user authorisation, linked to the existing resource classification levels.

Below we describe Multics and SELinux, two fundamental examples of MAC implementation.

MAC example 1: Multics and protection rings

Already mentioned above as a precursor of multi-user systems (also known as ‘time-sharing’ systems), the Multics project, released in 1969, was the source of many innovative features, particularly in its memory management and security. It prefigured MAC even before the formulation of models such as Bell-LaPadula (1973) and its first formal definition set out in the Department of Defense’s Orange Book (1983), which established US computer security standards.

It is based on the concept of rings of protection, which Multics created, as shown by its logo (image above), and which form the basis of MLS – Multi-Level Security – systems, widely used in highly confidential contexts. It consists of a set of concentric rings representing levels of sensitivity that increase the closer you get to the centre (ring 0) – and therefore the privileges required for access. Mechanisms known as guards or gatekeepers, located at the interface between two rings, closely control the legitimacy of access in both directions, which they grant or deny.

In reality, these rings are of two types:

– Kernel protection rings are physical rings built into processors and used by the operating system to guarantee its integrity against faults (which cause the machine to crash) or modifications, whether intentional or not.

– User space rings are logical rings implemented by the operating system. This is where MAC comes in. By means of labels, each user and each resource is attached to a ring level. From there, rules define the actions that can or cannot be taken, following the example of the Bell-LaPadula model, which emphasises data confidentiality: ‘No read up’ (a user cannot read access to layers higher than his own), ‘No write down’ (he cannot write to layers lower than his own, to avoid leaks).

The image below summarises the principle of protection rings.

 MAC example 2: SELinux, the Linux kernel security module

Initially developed by the NSA in 2001, SELinux was proposed and added to the Linux kernel security modules (LSM, Linux Security Modules) in 2003, and is natively integrated into RedHat distributions such as Fedora.

This is another well-known example of MAC implementation: it allows administrators to assign a security context label to each resource in order to classify them and define the security policies to be applied by the operating system. Even with privileged rights, an application will see its rights restricted to the domain it needs to function (for example, the folders specified), with SELinux detecting and preventing any non-compliant action.

SELinux therefore provides an additional layer of protection in the event that a user or process manages to bypass traditional access controls.

In practice, MAC policies are rarely sufficient on their own, but are superimposed on existing DAC rules, whose flexibility they compensate for.

Two models based above all on the identity of the user or process, on the basis of which they authorise or deny access: this is known as Identity-Based Access Control (IBAC). These models are still limited to local contexts and have little resistance to scaling up.

Role-based Access Control (RBAC)

Formulated in 1992 by David FERRAIOLO and Richard KUHN, two engineers from the American NIST, the RBAC model – role-based access model – was designed to simplify the management of permissions throughout an organisation while reflecting its structure as closely as possible (hierarchy, responsibilities, departments, etc.).

Instead of granting rights directly to an identity, as with IBAC, a method that can quickly become difficult to maintain, we design business roles and the associated privileges. Users then inherit the rights associated with their role within the company, enabling them to access the various applications and enterprise sharing systems considered necessary for their internal activities.

This initial conceptual framework was completed and standardised in 2004 with the ANSI INCITS 359-2004 standard, which takes into account practical business cases and scenarios. For example, it addresses the need to separate responsibilities (SoD, Segregation of Duty), which is fundamental in financial and banking institutions, as well as the principle of least privilege and the inheritance of permissions.

Progressive and increasingly centralised adoption of RBAC

From the 80s and 90s onwards, databases, which were widely adopted by large companies and likely to contain sensitive information to which access was naturally controlled, were pioneers in the implementation of the RBAC model. They illustrate its implementation at the level of isolated applications, with no repercussions for external applications or systems.

The 2000s saw the launch of Microsoft’s Active Directory, starting with Windows 2000 Server. This centralised directory is designed to manage all the organisation’s resources (people, physical resources, applications). Although it is not strictly speaking an RBAC tool, a comparison can be made. The allocation of access rights is based on security groups – which can be perceived as roles – with permission inheritance mechanisms and the concepts of domains, trees and forests designed to represent the logical structures of the company.

Modern IAM solutions, such as Okta, SailPoint IIQ and Microsoft AzureAD, now support RBAC for heterogeneous environments, including cloud services. They illustrate the gradual centralisation of access rights management, which was initially managed locally within applications, and is now increasingly delegated to IAM solutions covering the widest possible spectrum.

RBAC assigns rights based on a business role, whereas IBAC is linked to an identity. The layer of abstraction created between the subject’s identity and an individual’s role means that it can be extracted from restricted contexts (file systems for DAC, operating systems for MAC) and adapted (at last!) to the access control needs of organisations. However, they all share the characteristic of a rigid definition of rights, based on an identity or a role.

In entities where exchanges are increasingly dynamic and fluctuating, this abstraction through roles alone may prove insufficient. New models have emerged to represent more complex organisations, taking into account additional, evolving attributes to assess access rights to a higher accuracy at a given time: we are moving from admin-time to run-time.

New approaches to authorisation: Run-time

The increasing complexity of information systems, and therefore of access, has led to the run-time approach. This approach meets organisations’ needs for dynamic flexibility and security. Unlike the ‘admin-time’ era, characterised by static permissions, the ‘run-time’ era offers real-time management at the time of the access request, based on various contextual elements. This transition to more flexible and precise authorisation models enables organisations for adapting to change and better protect their resources against today’s threats.

Graph-Based Access Control (GBAC)

The GBAC (Graph-Based Access Control) or GraphBAC model is based on the use of graphs to represent the relationships between users, roles and resources within an organisation. These 3 types of entities (users, roles, resources) and the relationships between them form the core of this model: entities can be represented by the nodes of the graph, and the relationships between them by the edges.

Access authorisations to a resource are determined in real time by queries to this graph database, enabling access decisions to be made based on the connections between entities at the time of the request. Users can thus obtain access to a resource according to their role and their relationships with other users or resources in the organisation.

The GBAC model is suited to the dynamic environments of large organisations, where relationships between entities are constantly evolving. On the other hand, it can be complex to implement, and the projects involved are relatively long, with significant costs. In addition, the gradual addition of new relationships can make the graph increasingly difficult to manage, complicating internal audit or recertification activities, for example.

Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)

In the ABAC (Attribute-Based Access Control) access model, the management of access to a resource is based on the dynamic combination of attributes. These attributes relate to the user requesting access (role, group), the resource requested (type of resource) and the context in which the request is made (time of day, type of network). This approach makes it possible to authorise or deny access flexibly and in real time.

The model was formalised in 2014 in the publication by NIST (SP 800-162) which provides detailed information for its implementation.

4 components are essential to the operation of this model: Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs), Policy Decision Points (PDPs), Policy Administration Points (PAPs) and Policy Information Points (PIPs).

After interception by the PEP, the access request is transmitted to the PDP, which is responsible for making decisions by analysing the access policies managed by the PAP and often accessible from an access policy database. The PIP provides the PDP with additional information on the user or resource from different sources, enabling it to make decisions in line with access rules. For contextual information, the information system can be connected to other tools or sources (IDS, logs, sensors) that enable this information to be collected at the time of an access request.

ABAC is a particularly interesting model in environments where access needs are varied and evolving, as it enables fine, granular management of authorisations, particularly in the context of PAM (Privileged Access Management), concerning access and critical resources.

However, this level of detail and flexibility comes with challenges such as the ongoing review of attributes and the maintenance of policies, which require constant attention to ensure they meet the needs of the business. Over time, the increasing number of attributes and conditions can make it difficult to maintain a clear and functional ABAC architecture, especially in environments undergoing constant transformation.

In current ABAC architectures, PEPs are generally designed to work only with PDPs from the same vendor, using proprietary protocols, with no support for compatibility between different vendors.

Standardizing the way these different PEPs and PDPs interact, in order to improve system interoperability and reduce dependence on a single supplier, is the aim of the OpenID AuthZEN working group.

OpenID AuthZEN: towards improved interoperability

AuthZen is a working group initiative launched in 2023 by the OpenID Foundation to standardize the interactions between PEPs and PDPs, in order to improve interoperability between systems from different suppliers.

This initiative responds to current problems where authorization services (PEPs and PDPs) are often designed to work only with solutions from the same vendor, limiting their interoperability.

AuthZen was launched to develop a standardised protocol that would facilitate integration and communication between PEPs and PDPs, reducing dependency on single vendor solutions and improving overall authorisation security.

To make these interactions more flexible and universal, AuthZen relies on existing architectures and technologies (OPA/Rego, XACML, etc.) to improve deployment, scalability and interoperability. The first two stages of this standardisation with Open ID AuthZen are the implementation of a simple ‘Request/Response’ and ‘Permit/Deny’ type protocols and a multiple decision approach in order to group several authorisation requests into a single request and receive several decisions in return.

The AuthZen think tank includes security players such as 3Edges, Axiomatic and others. It is also open to players who want to develop authorisation systems and make architectures more secure and interoperable.

Prospects for the evolution of authorisation: Event-time

A new approach to the evolution of access systems is event-time. It is defined as an implementation of dynamic authorisation where access rights are adjusted in real time in response to immediate events or changes that occur. Unlike static or attribute-based approaches, event-time is characterised by a continuous evaluation of access rights, to ensure that all access remains compliant with the policies in place within the organisation.

For example, when a user’s status changes (promotion, departure, mobility, etc.), the system automatically adjusts or revokes their access rights. This proactive, event-based adjustment approach is common in information systems monitoring and security incident management.

Event-time is based on the following key concepts:

– Listeners: system components that monitor events in time and analyse important changes (mobility, promotions, departures, etc.) from various sources, in particular HR systems.

– Triggers: actions in response to an event identified by a listener, such as the revocation of access rights on the actual day a user leaves.

– Shared Signals: enabling different systems to share information about events in real time.

– Continuous evaluation: constant checking of access rights to ensure that each action or access remains in compliance with policies.

Frameworks and standards play a key role in implementing event-time by providing a structure for implementing the concepts in systems:

The Shared Signals Framework (SSF) is directly linked to the concept of shared signals, which enables systems via an API to share information about events in real time to ensure consistent access management. The continuous evaluation of this information is supported by CAEP (Continuous Access Evaluation Protocol), a protocol for standardising the writing of status changes. RISC (Risk and Incident Sharing and Coordination) is a generic protocol for standardising the transmission and reception of security incidents between these different systems, thereby enhancing the overall responsiveness of an information system.

Event-time is not based on a specific model such as RBAC or ABAC, but can function as a complementary access management layer to these traditional access systems, making them more dynamic and aligned with real-time situations.

The evolution of authorisation models, from traditional approaches to modern, dynamic methods, reflects the ongoing adaptation of IAM and access systems to the growing and changing needs of organisations.

Admin-time approaches laid the foundations for resource security with models such as DAC and MAC. RBAC introduced structured rights management, which is widely adopted in organisations today due to its relatively simple application.

With the advent of the runtime, access decisions became more refined, based on attributes specific to users, resources and context, as with the ABAC and GBAC models. However, these increasingly sophisticated models have led to the emergence of numerous proprietary solutions, limiting the interoperability of authorisation components and creating a dependency on specific technologies. This has led to the emergence of initiatives such as the AuthZen working group, which is working to develop standards.

The event-time approach provides real-time responsiveness, enabling systems to automatically adjust access in response to specific events. CAEP and the Shared Signals Framework facilitate this dynamic by standardising the exchange of information between systems, thereby strengthening security and compliance.

An overview of these different approaches and their associated models is presented in the timeline below, together with a summary table of the different models discussed.

By combining these different approaches, you can implement more secure, flexible and proactive access management, capable of responding to current and future identity-related challenges. These developments also highlight the importance of adopting adaptive and interoperable authorisation solutions to ensure effective protection of resources while meeting the operational requirements of teams.

These developments raise an essential question about the ability of organisations to anticipate these changes and integrate these new access management dynamics.

Whether you are still using admin-time models, exploring runtime options, or considering moving to event-time management, it is crucial to choose a model that meets your specific needs. It is also very important to anticipate the consequences for the management of this model over time (review of rights, measurement of data quality, review of policies, definition of expected reactions, etc.).  

What type of model do you use? 

Don’t hesitate to contact us to find out more and understand how to apply these authorisation models to your organisation’s context!

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Let’s continue here with a few additional questions – and answers – to explore the subject in greater depth.

How many roles do I need to create? How many roles should each user have?

It may be tempting to design a model that can handle every use case identified during a requirements collection phase. However, we should bear in mind that the model will have to live and evolve with new applications, new organizational units, etc.

There is no general rule on the number of roles to assign to each user. It is perfectly possible to build your model so that only one role is assigned per user, just as it is possible to assign several.

However, a compromise must be found between creating overly specific roles, which quickly fall into the “1 role for each user” pitfall, and creating overly general roles that do not bring much benefit and lead to over-allocation of rights.

Aiming for 80% of rights allocated via the role model and 20% of discretionary rights should already prove to be a good goal.

Bottom Up or Top Down, which method should I use?

There are two main methods that can be considered when creating an authorization model.

The “Bottom Up” approach starts from the existing rights and analyzes them to derive a model. For example, if all employees in the Accounting department have the same rights, then a role dedicated to this department can be created, which will contain the corresponding permissions. In this approach, data quality is a prerequisite for successful modeling, as wrongfully assigned rights would add noise to the model and reduce its relevance.

The “Top Down” approach starts by defining the theoretical authorization model, on which the necessary authorizations are then projected. For example, a role for the Accounting department can be created and include the permissions that business representatives deem necessary to accomplish their mission.

In practice, it is common to adopt an intermediate approach.

It is also recommended to work iteratively and to validate the approach on a pilot scope before generalizing it. The involvement of business representatives in the definition and validation of the roles plays a key role here.

What tools do I need?

The high volume of rights to be processed and the multiple iterations required imply the use of a tool that can either be sourced from the market or developed internally (Excel tables, database, scripts…). A prior analysis of the needs will ensure the adequacy of this tool.

In addition to the ability to create roles or rules for assigning rights, which is increasingly facilitated using algorithms that take advantage of machine learning, the chosen tool must facilitate the data quality cleaning phase before the actual modeling phase. It is also useful to have a simulation function that highlight the over- or under-allocations generated by the new model compared to current assignments.

In nominal mode, the IAM solutions on the market offer various possibilities that can used advantageously: role hierarchy, automatic ABAC-style allocations, suggested allocations, multiple role dimensions, etc. However, care must be taken not to fall for a model too complicated to use and administer.

If the choice of the IAM solution that will handle the model has already been made, it is necessary to ensure that this solution can handle all the desired complexity, even if it means making some simplifications or adjustments to the model.

Should I build my authorization model before, during, or after the implementation of my new IAM solution?

Generally speaking, it is preferable to design your authorization model before the implementation of a new IAM solution as the model can strongly influence the choice of the tool, depending on the adequacy of the technical possibilities and the functional expectations.

If data quality is satisfactory, the implementation of the model itself can then take place at the same time as the implementation of the IAM solution. If necessary, it is possible to plan a transition phase where the old tool can coexist with the new one. The perimeters ready for the transition to the new model can thus processed in the new tool, which gives more time for the migration of perimeters that require more work and time, although a migration schedule should be defined and closely monitored to avoid any drift that would prolong this situation for too long.

How much time should I plan?

The implementation of an authorization model is usually substantial project that requires the consideration of many factors and has a significant impact on all the stakeholders involved in the authorization environment (application managers, user support, business lines, etc.).

It is essential to take your time during the framing and design phase in order to ensure the success of your project.

The modeling phase can be long and tedious, especially if the volume is high in terms of the number of roles or the number of entities to be covered, or if the data quality is unsatisfactory and requires remediation.

Change management should not be neglected, given the impacts that are clearly visible to users. Training and a strong support phase are most of the time necessary once the model has been implemented.

What governance should I establish to bring my authorization model to life?

An authorization model is never static. The authorization catalog is updated as new applications are developed or decommissioned, the information system and business undergo evolutions, and reorganizations are carried out. Right from the design phase, it is necessary to reflect on the principles of current governance to avoid building a model that is too complex and impossible to maintain over time.

While the management of the model is often handled by a team dedicated to authorizations, the involvement of other stakeholders is essential, particularly on the part of the business, which must communicate any changes in its needs. The appointment of authorization correspondents within the business departments can be a way of encouraging this involvement.

Final words

The perfect implementation of an authorization model probably does not exist. Even if there is no major interdiction, finding a compromise between expectations and possibilities remains a delicate exercise that requires careful planning, preparation and monitoring.

In a nutshell, here are five good practices for the success of an authorization model redesign project:

1. Allocate sufficient time for the project.
2. Frame and steer the project with the greatest care to avoid deviations in terms of ambition, priorities, workloads or deadlines.
3. Communicate with and involve the right IT and business contributors.
4. Know when to say “no” if covering a need would risk deteriorating the ease of use or the maintainability too much.
5. Do not neglect the change management with the end-users.

It is worth note that these good practices remain perfectly applicable to any IAM project in general!

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DAC, RBAC, OrBAC, ABAC or GraphBAC? Flagship authorization models evolve regularly and each one brings its share of challenges, promises, and complexity.

Over the last twenty years or so, during which the RBAC/OrBAC models seem to have prevailed, the difficulties of designing, implementing and maintaining an authorization model have remained the same, and there are few examples of perfectly satisfactory achievements.

There are many questions about designing or redesigning one’s authorization model. In these two articles, we try to answer the most frequent ones.

Before we do that, let’s go back to some basic notions about authorization models.

What is an authorization model?

A layer of abstraction…

An authorization model is a layer of abstraction that comes above technical entitlements (application rights, transactions, groups, etc.). It is made up of carefully defined objects (roles, profiles, etc.), with a name in natural language, and often organized hierarchically.

… which simplifies the management of authorizations…

This layer of abstraction makes it possible to rationalize the number of objects to handle.

For the business, it becomes easier to understand the available authorizations and to request or validate the appropriate rights.

For IT and support teams, the burden of allocating authorizations is reduced overall. The implementation of automation tools can support a large part of the daily requests, allowing specific requests to be processed more carefully.

… and improves security

Beyond the regulatory and normative dimensions of authorization management, often highlighted by Auditors during their work, the lack of control of authorizations is an open door to intrusions and misuse of the information system.

Knowing one’s authorizations is a prerequisite for securing them, and the implementation of a model makes it possible to simplify the controls, particularly during review campaigns. It is indeed much easier for a manager to validate the allocation of a meaningful business role, rather than of a transaction with a very technical name.

Overview of possible models

DAC: Discretionary Access Control, aka no model at all!

What if the best model was the absence of a model? In some limited cases, especially if the number of authorizations or users is very limited, one can very well do without designing a model that would add an unnecessary layer of complexity. This implies, however, that the authorizations are sufficiently meaningful.

RBAC: Role-Based Access Control

The RBAC model allows to group the authorizations required to perform a function within a company (business, mission, project…) in “roles”. These roles are then assigned in lieu of discretionary authorizations. They can be organized hierarchically, for example by subdividing “business roles” into “application roles”.

OrBAC: Organization-Based Access Control

The OrBAC model is a variant of the RBAC model in which the entities that make up a company are one of the modeling dimensions. Each user then has one or more roles depending on which team(s) they belong to.

ABAC: Attribute-Based Access Control

The allocation of authorizations via the ABAC model is handled through a set of rules based on attributes related to users, resources themselves, or the environment. This allocation is often “dynamic”, meaning that the authorization to access an application or part of an application is evaluated at the moment the user tries to access it. In practice, it is possible to set up an ABAC model that takes advantage of user’s roles, as in the RBAC model.

GraphBAC: Graph-Based Access Control

The GraphBAC or GBAC model is based on the representation of authorizations using a graph linking objects (file, user account…) through various relationships (link between collaborator and manager, belonging to a structure, possession of a file…). The authorizations are then the result of queries on this graph, which allows to give access to a resource according to its relationship with other objects.

Market vision

The table below compares in a very synthetic way the different authorization models that we have just seen.

The most common questions about authorization models

What should my empowerment model be used for?

Setting up an authorization model can be complex, costly, and time-consuming. Therefore, it is crucial to study the needs in depth and to clearly define expectations. As mentioned in the introduction, the implementation of an authorization model can help address access security issues, meet regulatory objectives, but also simplify the user experience and improve the efficiency of Identity & Access Management (IAM) processes. One of the key success factors for an authorization modeling project is the ability to express the expectations precisely, using KPIs if necessary: reducing the time required for a manager to grant accesses when an new employee joins to 15 minutes, mitigating 90% of risks considered critical, etc.

Who should I involve to build, instantiate, and keep my model alive?

Given the cross-cutting nature and scale of the transformation induced by a change or creation of an authorization model, a strong governance is necessary.

It is preferable to involve a sponsor with high visibility from the EXCOM, who will be able to provide support, and obtain strong engagement from the business, the first concerned by the changes, and from application managers, who will be heavily involved during the design and implementation phases. Key contacts can also be identified, so that they can help different teams within the organization (HR, IT, Internal Control…).

Beyond the project phase, it is also necessary to identify the actors who will be in charge of keeping the model alive. A key success factor in the implementation of an authorization model is the identification of role owners. If each role includes only authorizations from a single application, one can easily to turn to the application manager, but in most cases, each role is made up of authorizations from various applications.

The ideal is to find someone who has both knowledge of business processes, company organization, applications, and an understanding of security rules: it’s a difficult exercise! Otherwise, a small team combining the different area of expertise should be able to perform this function.

Do I have to include “fine-grained authorizations”? The “perimeters”? How granular should my model be?

The world of entitlements is as vast as the multitude of existing applications, and the use cases that an authorization model must cover are numerous.

The topic of fine-grained authorizations and perimeter management regularly comes up during the design phase: should they be included in the model or not? There is no predefined answer.

It is perfectly conceivable, in some cases, to restrict the model only to the binary access to the application (yes/no), and to leave the management of the fine-grained authorizations and perimeters in the hands of the application manager and their team. The request form may then provide a text field to provide additional information. This results in less auditability, but the management of requests is simplified.

If we decide to include the concept of perimeter, we must choose between a cross-implementation, in which we create as many roles as there are combinations between authorizations and perimeters (possibly increasing significantly the number of roles), and a separate implementation, where the authorizations are created on one hand and the perimeters on the other.

It is probably best to deal with this issue separately, even if it means creating roles combined with their perimeter in the future, depending on the real use cases: the resulting model thus has a more reasonable size.

What should I include in my model? What about physical accesses and physical assets?

Including all the authorizations within one’s model is extremely difficult, if not impossible given the wide variety of cases, and for the sake of project efficiency.

The goal of the model must always be kept in sight. For example, if the goal is to improve the user experience when requesting rights, it is better to prioritize the processing of business-oriented authorizations, which are likely to be allocated frequently, over little-used technical authorizations.

In addition, it may be tempting to include physical access (premises, specific rooms, etc.) or physical assets (badges, PCs, telephones, etc.) in its authorization model, as they are part of the means that employees must have to work, just like logical accesses.

Again, there are no major prohibitions, and some companies may well manage access to their premises within their authorization model, but as a general rule, physical access and assets are rarely part of it.

An IAM solution may however help manage them properly:

• By centralizing requests, sent to different actors or systems upon arrival of a collaborator. This “arrival package” then includes both logical accesses (accounts and default rights) as well as physical resources.
• By providing a reference source for data and events related to a person. This information, especially arrival/departure dates, is shared with badge management systems to manage the badge lifecycle.

We have just addressed four initial questions to carry out a project to overhaul an authorization model. Other questions will be detailed in a second article, to be published shortly.

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